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Falling membership numbers and declining union density are issues of concern for 
Australian unions, and especially those in the transport and manufacturing sectors.  
Australian Bureau of Statistics figures show that between 2005 and 2008, trade union 
membership declined from 22.4 per cent to 18.9 per cent of the workforce. Studies 
and statistics have consistently shown that union membership and density is lowest in 
Western Australia and this is a continuing trend, despite reversals elsewhere. Using 
the Western Australian branches of two ‘blue-collar’ unions  – the Australian Rail, 
Tram and Bus Industry Union, WA Branch [RTBUWA] (which includes the former 
Locomotive Engine Drivers’, Firemen’s and Cleaners Union of WA, the 
WALEDF&CU), and the Australian Manufacturing Workers’ Union [AMWU], which 
now covers a wide range of metal working, printing and other manufacturing trades – 
as examples, this paper examines whether privatisation has contributed significantly 
to falling trade union density and membership in this State.  The RTBUWA and the 
AMWU are unions whose predecessors represented large public sector workforces. In 
order to test the hypothesis that privatisation has adversely affected union 
membership and density, the paper examines three areas: changing policies in the 
Australian Labor Party [ALP], the breaking down of union culture, and changes in 
trade training and concludes that privatisation is a significant factor in the recent 
decline of these two unions.  
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Introduction 
For labour historians making connections between the historic past and the 
present, contemporary issues that are of concern to trade unions are of immense 
interest.  Even a cursory survey of current ‘blue-collar’ trade union web sites, media 
releases and newsletters to their memberships will reveal perhaps half a dozen issues 
of particular concern to unions representing workers in the manufacturing, 
construction, transport and maritime industries.  These include training and work 
safety, and the removal of jobs offshore.  But underneath these concerns, less overtly 




anxiety over falling numbers and the even more dramatic decline in union density in 
the trades they represent.
1
  Australian Bureau of Statistics [ABS] figures show that 
between 2005 and 2008, trade union membership declined from 22.4 per cent to 18.9 
per cent of the workforce.
2
 Studies and statistics have consistently shown that union 
membership and density is lowest in Western Australia and this is a continuing trend, 
despite reversals elsewhere. A 2008 study found that ‘Western Australia had the 
lowest level of trade union membership of any state in Australia, with only 14.3% or 
142,600 employees being unionised’ and that this figure had declined by 1.4% from 
2007.
3
  The ABS figures for Australian trade union membership in August 2012 
confirm this, showing Western Australia’s as the lowest, with only 14 per cent of the 
workforce unionised
4
 – a further drop of .3% from the 2008 figures.  Research 
conducted in 2010 found a corresponding fall in the membership of some 
manufacturing and construction unions during this period.
5
 The author’s own research 
has revealed that the Australian Manufacturing Workers Union’s [AMWU] federal 
membership fell from 135,000 in 2005 to around 100,000 at the end of 2012. In WA, 
the union’s membership fell from 8,463 in mid 2005 to 7,371 in mid 2012.
6
 
Using the Western Australian branches of two ‘blue-collar’ unions – the 
Australian Rail, Tram and Bus Industry Union, WA Branch [RTBUWA] (which 
includes the former Locomotive Engine Drivers’, Firemen’s and Cleaners Union of 
WA, the WALEDF&CU), and the Australian Manufacturing Workers’ Union 
[AMWU], which now covers a wide range of metal working, printing and other 
manufacturing trades – as examples, this paper examines whether privatisation has 
contributed significantly to falling trade union density and membership in this State.  
The RTBUWA and the AMWU are unions whose predecessors represented large 




adversely affected union membership and density, the paper examines three factors: 
the Australian Labor Party’s [ALP] adoption of privatisation as a policy in the late 
1980s, the breaking down of union culture,
7
 and changes in trade training.   
 
Rationale for the Study 
The nationalisation of industry, unionisation and apprenticeship training represent the 
traditional foundations of the organised labour movement in Australia. Aided by the 
‘closed shop’ system that mandated union membership as a condition of hiring in 
many factories, the skilled trades elite of the blue-collar workforce was highly 
unionised, and each skilled trade union demanded a certain standard of training prior 
to being admitted to its membership. The shrinking proportion of the workforce 
occupied in manufacturing trades has doubtless contributed to the overall decline in 
numbers of union members in recent decades, but what has caused the fall in union 
members as percentage of the workforce?  
A number of factors have contributed to declining trade union membership 
and density.  These include demographic changes in the workforce resulting in an 
increase in trades and professions that are traditionally less likely to the highly 
unionized (such as tourism and hospitality) and decrease in manufacturing, where 
‘closed shops’ were once common; the increase of part-time and casual work and 
(some argue) the instigation of anti-union sentiment, particularly under the Howard 
administration of 1996 to 2007.  For example, as early as 1998, in his book, Unions in 
a Contrary World Professor David Peetz wrote of ‘an institutional break in union 
membership’ and ‘a paradigm shift in the way in which unions were treated by the 
society in which they operated’. Ellem and Franks, however, argued that this shift pre-




saw ‘workers in union strongholds [suffering] attacks from employers and lobbyists 
of the ‘New Right’ on sites as far apart as Sydney and Robe River.
8
   
But there is a significant literature that draws a correlation between declining 
union membership and the increasing privatisation of public industries. Studies in 
both Australia and Britain have indicated that privatisation of the industrial work 
force is a significant factor in reducing union density, and at times has been used as 
means of weakening union power, despite this usually being denied by corporate 
management. In 1998, for example, British Rail’s last Chairman, John Welsby, said 
that, while ‘some people’ saw ‘breaking the power of the unions’ as an aim of 
privatisation, he would ‘say it was the opportunity to bring working arrangements 
more into line with the norms applying at the end of the twentieth century’.
9
  In his 
study of the privatisation of British Rail, Tim Strangleman observed that ‘though not 
the only reason for privatisation’, one of its main ‘advantages’ was the 
‘marginalisation of organised labour through a breaking down of the collective 
structures of industrial relations’.
10
  Robert Griffiths, the historian of Britain’s oldest 
rail union, the Associated Society of Locomotive Engineers [ASLEF] concluded that: 
Privatisation of the railways represented a historic defeat for the people of 
Britain, for the labour movement and for the railway unions including ASLEF.  
In an era of management power, technological change and union mergers, 
what future could there be for one small union in such circumstances? The 





In another study, Ralph Darlington showed how, during the privatisation of British 
Rail, mass redundancies targeting older workers achieved a generational change and 
effectively got rid of the railway – and union – culture that might otherwise have 




union, the National Union of Rail, Maritime and Transport Workers  [RMT] was 
almost halved between 1992 and 1999.
12
   
Australian studies have also demonstrated strong connections between 
privatisation of industries and loss of union density in the workforce.  In a paper 
discussing the ‘winners’ and ‘losers’ in the Australian privatisation process by the end 
of the 1990s, economist Roger Wettenhall found trade unions to be among the 
‘losers’.  He wrote that the ‘combination of political, economic and social forces’ that 
had resulted in a ‘rapid increase in the number of Australians holding shares (and 
winning the financial benefits that come with them)’ had also produced ‘significantly 
higher unemployment levels’ and ‘a weakening of trade unions which have long 
protected worker interests’.
13
  Like Strangleman and Darlington, Wettenhall made a 
clear connection between the strengthening of the private sector and the weakening of 
trade unions, claiming that, ‘weakening them [unions] is one of the reasons for 
privatizing’.
14
  So, too, has David Peetz, Professor of Employment Relations at 
Griffith University, who argues that the shift of employment from the public to the 
private sector accounts for 22 per cent of the decline in union density that occurred 
between 1982 and 1990.
15
  The assumption in all of these studies is that, while many 
employers seek to present unions as ‘anachronistic’ and ‘unnecessary’ in the modern 
workplace, weakening the effectiveness and influence of trade unions is detrimental to 
workers as it limits their capacity to negotiate fair wages and safe working conditions.  
Australian Labour Market Statistics support an argument that the trend of 
union decline continues, with figures showing that while union density stood at 22.7 
per cent of the national workforce in 2009, it varied from 46 per cent in the public 
sector to just 14 per cent in the private sector.
16
 Figures for August 2012 indicate that 




whilst remaining steady at 14 per cent in the private sector.
17
 It is logical to conclude 
from these statistics that the more the private sector takes over industry, the more 
union membership and density will dwindle.  It is a far cry from the days of the 
‘closed shop’, where both employers and employees accepted mandatory union 
membership, albeit sometimes grudgingly.  In order to establish what facilitated this 
shift and how some of its outcomes may be detrimental to unions, the paper will now 
address each of the three factors mentioned above.  
 
Changes to ALP policy 
Historically, from colonial times until the 1970s, Australia had a large public sector 
compared with other Western democracies.
18
 Just to take one example for 
comparison, although the British Railways were developed and run by private 
companies from their commencement in the mid 1800s until 1945, Australian 
railways, with few exceptions, were always government owned, because only the 
colonial governments could raise the necessary investment to fund the extensive 
railway networks that served small, unprofitable populations.
19
 Privatising State-
owned factories and transport systems was not on the agenda of either side of politics 
until the 1980s, when swift changes occurred. Wettenhall dated the beginning of the 
‘dramatic change’ to privatisation from the latter years of the Fraser Liberal/National 
Party Government (1975–1983). But the ALP also shifted in this direction.  For 60 
years, from 1921 until 1981, the nationalisation of industry was an important element 
of the ALP’s ‘socialist objective’; both were abandoned at the 1981 National 
Conference.
20
 Inevitably, the privatisation of public assets in Australia was influenced 
by international events, especially the commitment by the Thatcher and Major 




industries and public utilities, such as railways, telecommunications, electricity, gas 
and water – a strategy continued by New Labour, after Tony Blair’s 1997 election 
victory.
21
   
The ideological shift signalled by the abandoning of Labor’s socialist 
objective intensified during the Hawke and Keating Labor administrations (1983-91 
and 1991-96).  Henceforth, influenced by international events and political 
expediency, both sides of politics embraced economic rationalism, apparently 
accepting that microeconomic reform was needed to improve the Australian 
economy.
22
 At first, the Hawke Government was ambivalent about privatising assets, 
probably because some Cabinet members were strongly opposed to the idea.  Soon 
after the ALP was elected to government in April 1983, the Federal Expenditure 
Review Committee met to discuss capital injections for Qantas and Australian 
Airlines. The Finance Minister, Senator Peter Walsh, believed that either the airlines 
should be allowed to increase their borrowings, but be required to pay interest at 
market rates, thus pressuring them to ‘maximise their performance’, or they should be 
sold.  Hawke, however, ended the debate by stating flatly, ‘That is an option which is 
available to our political opponents, but is not available to us’, and the airlines 
received further government funding.
 23
 But in 1987, this policy was reversed with 
Hawke announcing plans to sell Australian Airlines, Qantas, the Commonwealth 
Bank, Telecom, Australia Post and the Overseas Telecommunications Commission.  
Economist Stephen King has argued that this reversal of policy arose from the 
government’s ‘requirement for fiscal rectitude’.
24
  The stance adopted by both of 
Hawke’s Finance Ministers, Walsh and Willis, appears to support this conclusion.
25
  
But, although some Parliamentary Labor Party members, including Hawke, now saw 




the goods and services required by the public’ than by ideology,
26
 they failed to 
persuade the union movement of the efficacy of privatisation – and with good reason.   
Prior to winning the 1983 election, the ALP had negotiated the Prices and 
Incomes Accord (later known as ‘the Accord’) with the Australian Council of Trade 
Unions [ACTU].  In return for lifting the wages freeze imposed by the Fraser 
government, and increasing government spending on education and welfare, trade 
unions agreed to moderate their demands for wage increases, and thus minimise 
inflation.  The Accord had a precedent in the Social Contract agreed between the 
Labour government of Jim Callaghan and the Trades Union Congress in Britain in the 
mid 1970s, but was more durable, lasting until the Labor government lost the 1996 
election.
27
  Despite its creators, Hawke and ACTU Secretary Bill Kelty, continuing to 
insist even today that it was the solution necessary for ‘a bitter period’ when 
unemployment and inflation both stood at around 10 per cent,
28
 the Accord had its 
critics, initially limited to ‘Left organisations outside the Labor and the Communist 
Parties’ and ‘a minority of right-wing commentators’. Since the mid 1980s, however, 
critics have included ‘mainstream social democratic’ thinkers such as Stilwell, 
Singleton and Ewer et al, who argued that while the idea was sound, the fault lay in 
the implementation.
29
  Militant unions, such as the AMWU, which had originally 
supported the Accord, later saw it as serving the interests of capital, rather than 
unionists, and felt betrayed by its outcomes.
30
  
Meanwhile, in Western Australia, the switch to a ‘new look’ ALP was 
achieved after a leadership coup, which saw former railway worker Ron Davies 
ousted in favour of right winger Brian Burke, who subsequently led the Party to 
victory in the 1983 State election a month before Federal Labor’s win.  Ever since the 




foundation of an independent Trades and Labor Council of Western Australia in 1963, 
the relationship between the Party and the unions had been fraught with tensions.  
Throughout the 1970s and ’80s, the Party appeared to be distancing itself from the 
unions that had once provided the vast majority of its membership. Since the 1970s – 
as Australia’s highly unionised manufacturing base began its decline – the perceived 
wisdom for bolstering the ALP’s membership and maintaining a viable alternative 
government was to look for recruits in new places, such as the branches of 
unaffiliated, white-collar unions, or interest groups involving women, youth, 
immigrants and Indigenous Australians.  Burke and his cabinet personified ‘new look 
Labor’ – young, middle-class, educated professionals.
 31
  
Burke adopted a ‘presidential’ style of leadership.  His administration 
increased its executive powers by creating a new Department of Premier and Cabinet, 
which coordinated and monitored the implementation and review of Government 
policy, gave the Premier much greater control over Cabinet submissions, and 
streamlined the process of introducing and developing policy, while significantly 
reducing the control previously exercised by the Party’s State Executive.
32
   This 
meant that the new government was able to make many policy decisions without 
having to convince (or even consult) the State Executive. 
The government also established an active role for the State in economic 
planning.  This was not a return to the ‘nationalisation of industry’ platform that 
Federal Labor had abandoned at its 1981 National Conference, rather it was seen as a 
new cooperative arrangement between government and the private sector.  During the 
mineral boom, under non-Labor administrations, much of the State’s wealth had gone 
to investors in the eastern states or overseas.  In seeking to stop this ‘drain’, the State 




Australia; it entered new territory by implementing policies for generating wealth 
within the public sector.  To this end, the Burke administration set up such bodies as 
the WA Development Corporation, which purchased companies from major 
entrepreneurs – for example, Alan Bond, head of Bond Corporation – but (somewhat 
curiously) included those same corporation heads as Directors of the new state 
corporations.
33
  The Government’s appointment of entrepreneurs from the private 
sector to manage its assets was controversial, and would have devastating 
consequences for the ALP in Western Australia.
34
  The Burke government’s policies 
marked a new direction that boded ill for supporters of government-owned industries, 
and those who believed that it was a government’s function to provide facilities for its 
people.  
The Government and the Trades and Labor Council [TLCWA] signed an 
Accord-style agreement, formalised as the Western Australian Labor Tripartite 
Consultative Council Act, 1983, the three partners being government, industry and 
unions – although the TLCWA Executive was never enthusiastic and later claimed 
that, while the union movement had cooperated, the government had neither formally 
endorsed nor honoured the Tripartite Agreement.
35
    Conditions of the agreement 
included re-writing the Industrial Arbitration Act and establishing an Occupational 
Health and Safety Commission. Like the Accord, the Tripartite Consultative Council 
was criticised for silencing union opposition, and for not being ‘consultative’. The 
government’s refusal to consult was in evidence when, without involving the relevant 
unions, it retrenched 323 civil servants, closed the Public Works Department 
Architectural Division, cut wages and salaries and restructured or sold off a number of 
state assets – ostensibly to meet a $274 million shortfall left by the previous 




WA averaging 420 workdays lost per 1,000 workers, compared with a national 
average of 234 per 1,000.
36
  By 1984, the Civil Service Journal was accusing the State 
Labor Government of launching a ‘vicious and unrelenting onslaught’ against its 
members.
37
  Thus WA public servants – a sector of the workforce where union 
density was, and remains, comparatively high – experienced from a Labor 
administration the kind of mass axing that Federal public servants later underwent in 
the early days of the Howard administration.   
Shortly after the Burke administration won its second term in 1986, the 
TLCWA Executive signalled an end to the Tripartite Agreement by passing a 
resolution expressing its ‘abhorrence’ and rejecting a decision by government to 
‘reduce the working conditions of wage and salary earners’.
38
 One historian, Rose 
Graham, accused the Burke government of ‘harrass[ing], threaten[ing] and fin[ing] 
militant unions’ whilst favouring ‘compliant’ unions.
39
  By late 1985, many unions 
saw the privatisation of the public sector and the deregulation of the labour market as 
central to the State government’s agenda.  This belief sparked a series of anti-
privatisation campaigns of the latter 1980s, begun by individual unions but soon led 
by the TLCWA.   
The first Anti-privatisation Campaign aimed to educate business owners, 
employers and employees about the impact of privatising the public sector and 
deregulating the labour market. David Heald, a University of Glasgow economist, 
hired as a consultant by the ACTU to research privatisation and the erosion of the 
public sector, visited WA and spoke to the TLC.  He found some ‘disturbing parallels 
between the United Kingdom in 1976 and Australia in 1986’, yet concluded, that the 
labour movement could learn from British mistakes.
 
 In his judgement, the ALP was 




of New Right economics, because Australian trade unions were more disciplined and 
had brokered a far more effective Accord than the Social Contract between the 
Labour Party and British unions, which culminated in a ‘wages explosion’ in 1976. 
He assumed that lessons must have been learned from seven years of Thatcher 
Government policies, which had caused ‘massive unemployment’ and ‘territorial, 
social and racial divisions’.  Perhaps Heald’s most serious miscalculation, however, 
was that John Howard, then Leader of the Liberal Party in Opposition, ‘appears to 
lack the personal stature necessary to project himself as an alternative Prime 
Minister’.
40
  Heald appears also to have underestimated the impact of the policy shift 
within the ALP.  
Despite moving away from its traditional support base and policies, the ALP 
was struggling to find satisfactory alternatives.  In 1992, while on a visit to Perth, 
Federal ALP President Barry Jones had stated bluntly that unless the Party recruited a 
new generation of supporters, ‘the ALP as we know it will go out of existence’.
41
 The 
problem was exacerbated by the devastating 1996 Federal election loss in which not 
only swinging voters and the non-unionised deserted Labor, but also its ‘heartland’ – 
the blue-collar, unionised voters.  Following the defeat, in a revealing ABC Four 
Corners documentary, former Foreign Minister Gareth Evans declared that, 
‘everything Labor stands for is now open for discussion’.
42
 
 But Labor remained reluctant to admit that this ideological shift had already 
occurred with the wholesale of adoption of policies and programs that the Party would 
once have eschewed.  For example, while former Treasurer Ralph Willis later 
admitted that privatisation was ‘predominantly for budgetary enhancement’ and 
partially to overcome difficulties, such as low productivity, he judged Hawke’s 




stronger and more productive’.  Without the government’s ‘structural reforms’ 
(including privatisation), Willis concluded, the Australian economy would ‘still be 
stuck in the old uncompetitive, industrially combative, low-productivity, protectionist 
model’ and ‘the trade unions would be sharing a much smaller pie than the new 
globalised model can deliver’.
43
  
 While there may, indeed, be some justification for his argument that the 
Australian government’s large scale abandonment of the public sector, leaving many 
unions to face a hostile, privatised environment, was the only viable course of action 
in hard economic times, it is interesting to note Steven High’s opinion regarding 
similar situations in the USA and Canada.  High posits the theory that unionisation 
has remained much stronger in Canada, despite ‘massive job losses’ because of 
combined government and union action that saved many of Canada’s manufacturing 
industries from closing. He also argues that Canadian unions were in a much stronger 
position than their American counterparts because in the early 1980s they had 
succeeded in forcing governments to legislate ‘mandatory advance notice of mass 
layoffs, severance pay, preferential hiring rights, pension reinsurance, and job 
placement’, but also because they were able to cast factory closures as a struggle of 
‘Canadian workers’ against ‘American bosses’ as many factories were owned by US 
companies.
44
  Of most interest here, however, is High’s contention that the 
government’s intervention to prevent major steel and paper mills closing, together 
with ‘a long history of state intervention in [the] economy’ saved many jobs and also 
assisted in maintaining a strong union presence – unlike in the US.
45
  As this paper 
goes to press, a debate is occurring here about whether it is the Australian 
government’s responsibility to subsidise the local car industry in order to save 







The breakdown of union culture 
British studies of a range of industries have found that privatisation is often preceded 
by a dramatic reduction of the workforce by forced or voluntary redundancies, and the 
concurrent loss of trade union influence.  The new privatised industry then is able to 
institute poorer conditions and lower wages.  Of most relevance to this paper is 
Darlington’s previously-mentioned study of the mass redundancies that occurred prior 
to the privatisation of British Rail in the late 1990s.
47
 A similar ‘clearing out’ of 
ageing workers who subscribed to the ‘redundant’ union culture occurred in some WA 
industries in preparation for privatisation.  In the years before privatisation, between 
1980 and the beginning of 1993, under both Labor and Liberal governments, Westrail 
more than halved its staff from 10,000 to 4,800, thus drastically affecting a number of 
the unions representing rail employees, including the AMWU, the WALEDF&CU and 
the Australian Railways Union [ARU]. 
 It is worth noting that three years before the election of the Howard 
government – described by Muir and Peetz as ‘the most aggressively anti-union 
government in a century’
48
 – the Liberal-National Coalition government of Richard 
Court had come to power in WA. Apart from closing major publicly owned facilities 
including the Government Railway Workshops at Midland, and the Robb Jetty Meat 
Works, and cutting staff at Bank West, the State Government Insurance Commission 
and the State Electricity Commission, the Government legislated a series of ‘industrial 
reforms’ to weaken the industrial relations system, which served as a model for the 
Howard Government’s industrial relations policy from 1996.
49
  During the 1990s, 
according to Bailey et al, union density in the public sector in WA fell faster than in 




(1993-1999), the State Teachers’ Union reported ‘a 15 per cent drop in membership’ 
while the CPSU/CSA membership ‘declined by 40 per cent’.  Only the Australian 




  In the process of closing the Midland Government Railway Workshops in 
March 1994, Westrail (formerly the WA Government Railways), shed a further 1,100 
jobs over two years.
51
 But even prior to this, between 1991 and 1994, approximately 
1,250 WALEDF&CU members took voluntary redundancy, reducing the union’s 
membership to 814.  By 1998, it numbered 360.
52
  Further railway job losses came 
after State Transport Minister Eric Charlton’s 1995 announcement of the introduction 
of the ‘Right Track’ program to modernise Westrail.  Although he said that there 
would be ‘no sackings’, Charlton revealed that there would be a further 1,345 jobs lost 
over three years, as a result of outsourcing services that had previously been carried 
out by Westrail, such as locomotive and track maintenance and telecommunications – 
a move that was expected to create only 700 jobs in the private sector.
53
 In summary, 
three issues are significant here: that Westrail had shed three quarters of its workforce 
between 1980 and 1995, that the government envisaged that fewer than half of the last 
1,345 jobs to be lost would be filled in shifting services to the private sector, and that 
these jobs were likely to be non-unionised.   
Technological change, too, has impacted significantly upon the nature of blue-
collar work.  Evidence suggests that where the introduction of technology has led to a 
de-skilling of the workforce, a decline in demand for training, and increased employee 
dissatisfaction often results, creating greater worker mobility between jobs, and a 
subsequent breaking down of the type of strong workplace identity that once 




railways, as exemplified by Tim Strangleman’s story of a British train driver, which, 




In the early 1960s, Clive Groome began work cleaning steam engines … in 
south London for the then nationalised British Railways.  Dirty but important 
work, being a cleaner acted as an introduction to the world of railway 
employment.  Groome gradually climbed his way up the promotional ladder, 
rooted in a seniority system, as countless generations of railway servants had 
before him, to the point where he became a driver… During the 1980s, he left 
the industry because of his increasing disquiet at the levels of monotony, 
which he believed were dangerous, and the ever greater management 
interference in the job of a driver.
55
  
Australian footplate staff had the same career structure as their British 
counterparts.  Although there was no apprenticeship equivalent to that served by other 
skilled trades people, such as boilermakers, fitters and turners, drivers all began their 
careers as either an engine cleaner or a call boy.
56
 Cleaners were promoted to firemen 
and eventually to the first of five classes of locomotive driver.  With the advent of 
diesel and electric engines, the fireman became the driver’s assistant.  In 1983, the 
WALEDF&CU threatened to call a demarcation dispute when the Railways 
Department attempted to promote other railway staff, such as guards, to driver 
positions.
57
   But all that has changed.  Evidence from interviews that this author 
undertook in 2012-13 with older enginemen either retired or on the verge of 
retirement, suggests that union membership is now much less common among 
metropolitan train crews in Perth, and the promotion structure has been destroyed. 




security guards, who were not ‘brought up’ in the ‘railway culture’ as were lads who 
joined the railways at sixteen.  Trained as engine drivers in a few weeks and possibly 
regarding this as just the next job rather than a permanent position, they do not see a 
need to join the union, and are reluctant to pay the union dues.  An aggressive culture 
of anti-unionism exhibited by private rail owners also intimidates some potential 
unionists. In particular, American companies such as Genessee & Wyoming Australia 
[GWA], have displayed hostility towards unions, with one driver claiming that the 
company set out to destroy the RTBU.
58
 So far, it has not succeeded, with union 






A union culture is evident among ore train drivers, however.  The only 
unionised section of the mine site workforce, Rio Tinto drivers – who are almost all 
CFMEU members under a collective agreement –– work under extremely difficult 
conditions.  They have little advance knowledge of what each shift will entail, 
whether they will be driving in the yard or undertaking long journeys, or how long 
their shifts will be.  They are constantly recorded and monitored.  Yet even in this 
environment, a railway culture has begun to flourish.  Drivers speak of ‘feeling the 
train’ and ‘not tormenting the train’.  This knowledge, gained from experience of 
driving on particular tracks, is what they are now expected to feed into a computerised 
system so that the trains can be automated; Rio Tinto will no longer require drivers on 
their mainline ore trains.  The automated system will be controlled from an office in 
Perth, 1,500 kilometres from the mine site.  In order to achieve this, the company 
requires its current drivers to do themselves out of a job by teaching the track to an 
automated system that is scheduled to replace them in 2014.
60
 Ironically, although 




engine drivers, in which a new driver would travel with an experienced driver to 
‘learn the road’. Indeed, the union insisted on this practice prior to a driver operating 
an unfamiliar stretch of line. Rio Tinto’s CEO says ‘mining is about data’ – by 
inference, it is nothing about people.
61
   
Interference and breaking down of jobs into repetitive, easily controlled and 
quantified tasks, and tasks that do not require much skill are modern corporate 
management tactics with an origin on the assembly lines of the early 20
th
 century. It 
was a strategy that was attempted by management, and strongly resisted by the 
unionised work force at the Government Railway Workshops in the mid 20
th
 century. 
And in due course, the Workshops was deemed to be ‘inefficient’ and closed. It is not 
coincidental, therefore, that the advent of privatisation, which has brought corporate 
management styles to industry, is concurrent with the decline of union and employee 
power, the dwindling of union membership, job losses, de-skilling and decreased 
training opportunities.  
 
The Impact of Privatisation on Training opportunities 
The closure of the Railway Workshops had a substantial negative impact upon the 
Western Australian economy, with heavy engineering contracts going interstate or 
overseas, and many training opportunities for industrial apprentices disappearing.
62
  
Consequently, a major provider of trained skilled trades people who had been the 
backbone of the AMWU and its predecessor unions, such as the Amalgamated 
Engineers, ceased to exist. Other public facilities that offered apprenticeship training, 
such as the State Electricity Commission, were also dismantled and privatised. 
Apprenticeship training became reliant upon the private employer’s capacity or 




capacity to offer more than a few apprenticeships, and many, in the opinion of union 
officials, were not interested in doing so. Another aspect of apprenticeship training 
was that it brought boys into contact with men who were, for the most part, 
committed unionists.  Former East Perth Power Station employee Neil Byrne recalled 
as a young apprentice listening to the tradesmen discussing the pros and cons of the 
1952 metal workers’ strike at the Government Railway Workshops. Although the 
Power Station employees were not on strike, there was considerable debate among the 
workers about the rights and wrongs of the situation.  The members of two militant 
unions operating at the Power Station, the Amalgamated Engineers and the 
Boilermakers (both predecessors of the AMWU) made a token gesture of staying 
away from work one day in each pay cycle in solidarity with their Workshops 
comrades. Apprentices would sometimes attend the meetings and hear arguments for 
and against maintaining the strike. ‘And the tradesmen would say, “but you don’t 
want to join the union until you are out of your apprenticeship”, which in my view 
now, was wrong’.
63
  While not all workers were as committed to the union as Byrne, 
who later became an AMWU official, most did not question the need to join once they 
completed their apprenticeship. 
The current, on-going shortage of skilled Australian workers and the stop-gap 
measures being applied, such as 457 visas, indicate that neither State nor Federal 
governments are prioritising training, and that private enterprises either lack the 
capacity or the incentives to train workers.  Those who do offer any formal training 
are unlikely to provide their employees with full trade training, which is increasingly 
seen by employers as being the responsibility of the employee, not themselves.
64
  
Shorter traineeships have become an attractive and affordable option to many 




According to a 2001 study by Kapuscinski, major aspects of the changes in 
the Australian training system in the decade 1986-97 included the considerable 
increase in young people commencing traineeships, to a point where they exceeded 
apprenticeships for the first time in firm-based training.  In that period, the 
percentage of trainees had risen from less than one per cent to 46 per cent of ‘total 
firm-based trainee stocks’.
65
 These findings – together with others from the National 
Centre for Vocational Education and Research and Evaluation Program [NCVER] 
showing that, between 2001 and 2005, the number of hours of employer-sponsored 
training had fallen by 15 per cent for permanent and 27 per cent for casual 
employees
66
 – indicate a trend of shortened, specific and limited skills training on 
the individual factory floor, and a decreased employer contribution to the overall 
cost. Possibly, this trend indicates a demand by private employers for limited, but 
specialised, training for their employees. 
The burgeoning of traineeships in recent decades has provided a much 
greater range of choice in available training, but also some confusion about what 
constituted a traineeship and what an apprenticeship, and the differences between 
them.  Kapuscinski defined apprenticeships as a (normally) four-year, structured 
form of indentured training, whereby apprentices are taught according to a pre-
determined format or plan, are subject to monitoring by their employer, and upon 
completion become qualified tradespersons in a recognised trade.  Traineeships, on 
the other hand, ‘are specialised contracts of training …[lasting about] 12 months’.  
They:   
… combine work and formal training in a mix dependent on [the] trainee’s 




people according to current industry requirements so that upon completion 
trainees receive recognised qualifications.
67
   
Two studies undertaken in the latter 1990s (by Dockery et. al and May, 
respectively) undertook to answer questions about the cost of training apprentices and 
the effectiveness of the new methods of assessment. Dockery et. al., using 59 case 
studies of Australian firms employing apprentices, found that, while many employers 
demonstrated ‘altruistic motives’
68
 in accepting and training apprentices, thereby 
incurring a considerable expense to the firm, the outlay on training could be 
considerably less in larger firms where ‘economies of scale’ operated, or where an 
apprentice was trained in work of a ‘lower skill content or less variety’ or there was a 
lower level of supervision.
69
 John Mossenton, an official with the AMWU, 
corroborated these findings in a conversation with the author,
 70
 in which he stated 
that only the largest private firms were able or willing to offer apprenticeship training 
of the scope provided in the past in Western Australia by State-owned facilities, such 
as the Government Railway Workshops or the State Electricity Commission.
71
   
Dockery et al also considered the matter of incentive, asking, ‘Why do profit 
maximising firms continue to provide apprenticeship training?’ Furthermore, ‘What 
other benefits do they receive from investing in apprenticeship training and how are 
these accrued by the firm?’  The researchers were unable to answer this question 
satisfactorily, but suggested that in the future, firms might not be so willing to foot 
the training bill and might instead ‘push for the public to bear more of the costs of 
apprenticeship training’.
72
  They also observed that the positive findings of the study 
regarding the willingness of employers to pay and train apprentices, the lack of 
support for any reduction in apprentices’ wages, and, in particular, the apparently 




the firm were to some extent biased by the absence in their study of any business 
which did not train apprentices.
73
 
Dockery, et al. commended the proposed New Apprenticeships System 
(NAS), as it was designed to reduce the cost burden to employers and introduce 
‘greater flexibility’ into the training structure.
74
  Yet when Roger May examined the 
New Apprenticeship Training and Assessment System (NATAS) and the Module 
system operating in Western Australia in his 1999 doctoral thesis, he found 
problems with the ways that apprentices’ competencies were assessed by the new 
training schemes. May concluded that there were discrepancies in both schemes 
between ‘broad competency standards’ offered in TAFE courses and the ‘specific 
standards of individual organisations’, and that this variation caused confusion.  It 
was a perception of some managers, at least, that the problem arose partly from the 
conflicting aims of education and industry.  May found that: 
Industry was concerned with the rapid acquisition of skills and knowledge 
where time equated with money… [whilst] the education culture was [to 
impart] a broad knowledge base to the student where time involved was less 
critical.
75
   
Consequently, he advocated the need for greater consultation between the education 
provider and the individual employer, and in particular, adequate training for shop 




Another problem has been the attrition rate of apprentices.  Statistics produced 
by the WA Government’s Department of Training and Workforce Development show 
that, from 2010 to 2012, only about half of the people commencing apprenticeships 
completed them.
77




to complete their courses.  These may include finding that the course did not suit their 
needs, inability to meet fees, or the demands of the employer.  The high dropout rate 
appears to indicate that, as a means of fulfilling industry’s requirements for skilled 
employees, the current system is much less viable than the more regimented 






Economists have expressed varied opinions about the advantages of privatisation. As 
early as the mid-‘90s, King warned that for privatisation to enjoy ‘long term success’ 
in Australia, ‘the pressure for competitive reform must be maintained’.  Otherwise, 
‘we are likely to see a privatisation agenda run increasingly for short term revenue 
and political gains’.
78
  Wettenhall argued that the advantages that privatisation 
brought to some sections of the community equally disadvantaged others,
 79
 and 
McKenzie asserted that the main reason for privatisation, promoting investment in the 
economy, was not realised – at least not to the extent anticipated.
80
  Elsewhere it has 
been claimed that, while ‘privatisation is rarely popular with electorates’, overall the 
outcomes had been generally satisfactory and there were ‘no credible Australian 
voices in favour of any re-nationalisations’.
81
  Apart from Wettenhall, however, none 
of these sources examined the impact of privatisation on unions. 
Not surprisingly, trade union officials are among the harshest critics of 
privatisation.  In 2009, the RTBU condemned the process both in Australia and 
abroad.  In Queensland, the union was fighting attempts to sell off parts of 
Queensland Rail.  National Secretary Phil Kessey believed that ‘privatisation of rail 




payers’ because ‘time and again we see private rail operators walking away from their 
responsibilities to properly run and maintain railways’.
82
  A report on activities 
around Australia showed that in three states, and nationally, the Union was struggling 
to protect jobs and maintain conditions against private rail companies, while in 
Tasmania, the state was about to resume control of the rail network following Pacific 
National’s withdrawal.  Similarly, the journal reported, in 2008 the New Zealand 
Labour government bought back rail and ferry services that had been sold to private 
consortium Tranz Rail in 1993, and then sold on the Australian company Toll 
Holdings.  The purchase cost New Zealand taxpayers $665 million.
83
  Kessey 
commented that ‘this is another risk governments take when selling off 
infrastructure’.
84
   
An unattributed feature article in the same issue of Australian Rail Tram and 
Bus Worker listed a series of failures by private rail companies across Australia 
including WA’s private freight operation WestNet demanding $50 million from the 
State government to keep grain lines open.  The article also commented on the 
situation in Britain, where government-owned British Rail was split into over 100 
companies covering telecommunications, infrastructure and rolling stock, at the cost 
of safety and service, to the extent that:  
British rail has become the most expensive in Europe while attracting record 
taxpayer subsides.  Customer service and the manufacture of rolling stock 
have declined, while fares have increased ….A series of serious accidents in 
the post-privatisation period killed 48 and injured 820 people, drastically 
undermining confidence in rail safety.
85
  
Although ABS figures for May 2010 showed a slight reverse of this trend 




Morning Herald editor Mark Davis, published in September 2010, indicated varying 
results regarding union capacity to recruit new members.  While the membership of 
some unions increased, others continued to decline.  Davis found that some blue-
collar unions, in particular the AMWU, lost members not only during the AWA-
period, but between the 2007 change of government and the end of 2009.  As 
mentioned earlier, the AMWU’s federal membership fell from 135,000 in 2005 to 
around 100,000 at the end of 2012.
86
 In WA, the union’s membership fell from 8,463 
in mid 2005 to 7,371 in mid 2012.
87
  The Federal body of the RTBU has reversed the 
decline in its membership since 2009 – but only after numbers had plummeted from 




  But in 
WA, where there are only a few hundred members, between 2004 and 2011 
membership continued to decline from 659 to 211.
89
  Thus, although some unions 
have been able to halt and even reverse the decline in their membership as a result of 
more favourable industrial laws, others have not yet been able to do so.   
In the case of the AMWU, a significant factor is the number of manufacturing 
jobs that have gone overseas in the past decade.  In a 2006 address to the National 
Press Club, Heather Ridout, the CEO of Australian Industry Group, stated that 30,000 
jobs were lost in the manufacturing industry in 2005.  She said that 15 per cent of 
Australia’s manufacturing industry was overseas based and that was predicted to rise 
to 25 per cent in the next three years
90
 – a period that coincided with the change of 
federal government. In March 2013, with this trend showing no sign of decreasing, 
AMWU national secretary Paul Bastian called for companies such as Telstra, which 
benefit from millions of dollars of public money and government contracts, to be 
compelled to employ Australian workers instead of going offshore in order to boost 
their profits by employing overseas workers under poor wages and conditions.
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far, there appears to be no stemming of the offshore flow of manufacturing jobs, and 
the AMWU faces the ongoing prospect of losing members, despite an pro-active 
program of amalgamations that has seen it absorb workers in ship building, food and 






This paper has examined two Western Australian unions – the AMWU and the 
RTBU/WALEDF&CU – to examine the impact of privatisation on union membership 
and density.  It has argued that the privatisation of the work force has been a 
significant factor in reducing union membership and union density, and has been used 
as means of weakening union power.  In order to test this argument, three factors were 
examined:  the impact of changing ALP policy, the decline of union culture and 
reduced training opportunities.  Although the selling off of the public sector and the 
expansion of private enterprise was facilitated by both Liberal and Labor 
governments, it was a particularly marked change of policy for the ALP, heralded by 
rescinding the socialist objective in the 1981 Federal conference.  The privatisation 
policy of the late 1980s resulted in the trade union movement deserting the ALP en 
masse at the ballot box in 1996 as a form of protest, and possibly never returning to 
the extent that was taken for granted in the past.  But the sundering of the industrial 
union base from the ALP has been a two-way process. In trying to escape the tired old 
media adage that the Party is ‘run by union bosses’ and appeal to a more diverse 
electorate, the ‘new’ ALP has distanced itself from trade unions, to the extent of 
blaming Federal and WA electoral defeats in 2013 on the public rejecting the 




The evidence presented also indicates that privatisation in the two WA unions 
was preceded by massive job losses and a resulting decline in union membership and 
density, but also a loss of union culture.  This was particularly marked in the railways, 
once known for a very strong identity.  The closure of large public facilities such as 
the Government Railway Workshops and the State Electricity Commission also 
resulted in reduced training opportunities for trades people.  Formerly, a trades 
apprenticeship was not merely an entry to a trade but also to the relevant union.  This 
connection has been broken by semi-training as well as high job mobility.   
While some might regard such changes as a progressive step – breaking out of 
a elitist (and often sexist) mould and granting more and wider opportunities to female 
and older trainees, evidence suggests that privatising public instrumentalities has not 
always yielded the anticipated benefits of efficiency, prosperity and productivity.  In 
reality, privatisation has resulted in the breaking up of public facilities into separate, 
privately owned and sometimes competing companies whose aim is profit and who 
generally do not offer a service (such as training young workers) once it becomes 
unprofitable to do so.  WestNet’s demands for the state government to subsidise them 
to transport grain from country districts is just one example of this hard-nosed 
attitude.  Ironically, the breaking up of public instrumentalities into multiple private 
companies, far from creating greater efficiency and productivity, has at times resulted 
in the opposite effect, as indicated by the previously-mentioned fate of British Rail, 
and outcomes in this part of the world. But despite private rail systems failing in New 
Zealand and Tasmania, obliging and state and national governments to buy back 
transport systems that, with hindsight, should never have been sold in the first place, 
there seems little prospect of the Australian Federal Government (whether Liberal or 




union density may be increasing slightly in the private as well as the public sector 
since 2007, although there are some discrepancies.
93
  While there have been positive 
signs for unions following the abandoning of Work Choices post 2007, the recent 
change of Federal government may herald another period in which unions and their 
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